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The Nature of Consent in the American
Republic: Substance or Procedure?
The Elections Clause and Single-
Member Congressional Districts
By ROBERT ALEXANDER SCHWARTZ*
FOR MOST OF the last 162 years, Congress has regulated the "man-
ner" of congressional elections by imposing a requirement that its
members be elected from single-member districts.' In doing so, it has
presumed to exercise its authority under Article I, Section 4, the
"Elections Clause," of the Constitution, which provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legis-
lature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of ch[oo]sing
Senators. 2
Throughout much of that time, commentators and courts have
tended to take for granted the assumption that requiring single-mem-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Amalya L. Kearse, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 2003-04. J.D., New York University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Tufts
University, 1998. Thank you very much to Professors Burt Neuborne and Nancy Northup
and the participants in the Fall 2002 Brennan Seminar on Democracy at New York
University School of Law.
1. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY- LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 1156-58 (2d ed. 2001). A "single-member district" is the basic unit com-
prised by "the traditional Anglo-American electoral structure of territorially-based election
districts," represented in a legislative body by one individual representative. See id. at 1089.
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. It might also be argued that Congress has the author-
ity to do this under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as a prophylactic measure to
prevent unlawful race discrimination. Although a full discussion of Section 5 is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is suggested, for the purpose of focusing on Article I, Section 4, that
the imposition of single-member districts for this purpose might fail in two respects. First,
this measure might fail the "congruence" and "proportionality" requirements for such pro-
phylactic legislation announced in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). A
requirement of "alternative voting systems" such as "cumulative voting," "limited voting,"
or at-large elections with a "bullet-voting" option may be more congruent and propor-
tional. For an overview of alternative voting structures, see generally IsSACHAROFF, supra
note 1, at 1089-1172. Second, and more importantly, this measure applies "uniformly
throughout the Nation," a feature that helped to doom the Violence Against Women Act
in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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ber districts has been a valid regulation of the "manner" of election
under Article I, Section 4.3 In fact, none other than James Madison,
who was not one to speak without prior contemplation, once included
district elections in a list of items that might come under the heading
of "Times, Places and Manner." He noted that it covered "' [w] hether
the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this
place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one
place, sh[oul]d all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district
vote for a number allotted to the district."' 4
This Article recognizes the incredulity with which many readers
might react to the suggestion that we reexamine Madison's inclusion
of district elections on that list, and further recognizes that many
courts would likely find his comments to be dispositive of the issue.
During our republic's early years, however, there was not unanimity
on the question of whether the Elections Clause did actually authorize
a requirement of single-member districts by Congress. In 1800, the
House of Representatives spent two months considering a constitu-
tional amendment that would have required districting in congres-
sional elections. 5 That measure was rejected, as were similar efforts to
amend the Constitution repeatedly between 1800 and 1842, when
Congress finally enacted a single-member district requirement by or-
dinary legislation.6 The consideration of such amendments suggests
that its proponents did not believe single-member districts could be
required by statute. The Supreme Court has noted that congressional
authority to enact this requirement was doubted by some throughout
the nineteenth century, and as late as 1901 by committees of Con-
3. See, e.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 26 (1892) (assuming, without analysis,
constitutionality of single-member district requirement as evidence of constitutionality of
district-based election of presidential electors). James Thomas Tucker argues that since
many Framers likely assumed that elections would be by district, Congress must be en-
dowed with the authority to mandate them. James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American
Democracy: Do Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning of "Representation", 7 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 357, 374 & n.78 (2002) ("Although Congress has the authority to mandate
districting. ... ."); see also Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: the Case for
Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1996) (relying on McPherson dicta to assume consti-
tutionality of district-based House elections). But see generally Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitu-
tional Politics, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519 (2001) (arguing that single-member district
statute is unconstitutional commandeering of state legislatures).
4. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833 (1995) (citation omitted)
(striking down the Arkansas congressional term-limits provision).
5. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1776-1850 128 (1987).
6. Id.
[Vol. 38
gress. 7 Strangely, although the Supreme Court has never considered
the subject directly, little debate remains today. This Article suggests
that with over two hundred years of republican experience upon
which to reflect, it is sensible to reexamine the propriety of including
the question of districting in a category of otherwise ministerial
matters.
Part I will examine the relatively scant body of Supreme Court
precedent concerning the Elections Clause. It reaches the conclusion
that although Congress's power to legislate on congressional elections
is broad within the "procedural" realm, this power does not reach
questions with non-neutral, substantive political ramifications. Part II
applies the Supreme Court precedent to the question of single-mem-
ber districts and concludes that there is a colorable argument that the
question of districting falls outside the scope of Congress's Elections
Clause powers. This argument, in turn, comes in two parts. Part II.A.
argues that this decision is not properly characterized as "procedural"
because electing congressmen by district is outcome determinative, re-
stricts voters' choice of candidates, and more broadly effects a signifi-
cant shift in the balance of power among represented states in
Congress. Part II.B. suggests alternative grounds for concluding that
the choice between single-member districts and at-large elections is
not procedural. Summarily stated, not only does the selection of sin-
gle-member districts effect a palatable change in the potential out-
come of elections, but the decision to use them at all goes right to the
heart of the meaning of "consent" and "representation" in our
democracy.
It should be noted at the outset that this Article does not argue
that a system other than single-member district elections would be
preferable. It simply suggests that the federal legislative requirement
sits on shaky constitutional grounds. For better or for worse, the selec-
tion of congressmen through elections in single-member districts af-
fects not only how we vote, but for whom we vote. It codifies into law
one of many sets of assumptions about fairness, proper consent of the
governed, and the meaning of republicanism. Lumping that decision
together with matters like the proper format of ballots is a serious
mischaracterization.
7. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946).
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I. The Supreme Court's Notion of "Times, Places and
Manner"
The history of Elections Clause jurisprudence at the Supreme
Court level reveals an early expansion of congressional and state
power in this arena, followed by, if not quite a contraction of its sub-
ject matter, the assertion of new limitations.8 While the Court has held
that Article I, Section 4 permits Congress and the states to enact a
"complete code for congressional elections,"9 it has asserted more re-
cently that this power to enact a complete code is limited to "inci-
dents"10 of the election process, which can properly be characterized
as "procedural." 1
A. Early Expansion of "Times, Places and Manner"
Early Supreme Court cases examining congressional and state
power under the Elections Clause embraced an expansive view of the
Clause's subject matter. These cases were generally confined, how-
ever, to instances in which Congress had enacted legislation aimed at
its own preservation as an institution and its freedom from corrupt
practices rather than broader measures with specific political ramifica-
tions. Furthermore, the cases often focused on enactment require-
ments alleged to affect the validity of laws enacted under this power.
8. The concurrent nature of Elections Clause power may inspire some confusion in
examination of the case law. Some of the cases discussed explore the bounds of state power
under the Elections Clause, while others discuss limits on Congress. Because powers are
nearly coextensive, subject to the limitation that Congress is proscribed from making law
'as to the Places of ch [oo]sing Senators," the reasoning in each type of case and the limits
each imposes ought to be interchangeable. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Obviously, the
decision between single-member districts and some other method of election must be
vested in some level of government. The conclusion reached here, however, is that this
power does not vest by way of the Elections Clause. One alternative may be the Tenth
Amendment's Reservation Clause, which would reserve this power to the states. This argu-
ment would face the obstacle of directly adverse Supreme Court precedent. U.S. Term Lim-
its held that "'the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of
the existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to
them.... No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.'" 514 U.S. at 802
(citation omitted). The Justices were not, however, unanimous in that view. "The majority
is... quite wrong to conclude that the people of the States cannot authorize their state
governments to exercise any powers that were unknown to the States when the Federal
Constitution was drafted." Id. at 852 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
10. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001).
11. See US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832.
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Ex parte Siebold'2 is an example of this early type of "Times, Places
and Manner" case. Siebold involved a group of criminal defendants
charged with unlawfully obstructing and interfering with a congres-
sional election by abusing their authority as elections officers to over-
see the collection and counting of ballots. 13 They were accused of
interfering with the federal election officials' duty to oversee the han-
dling of ballots by refusing the officials access to the site while they
"stuff[ed] the ballot box" with twenty illegal ballots. 14 Counsel for the
accused conceded that Congress might "assume the entire regulation
of the elections of representatives." 15 He argued, however, that the
Clause bestowed no power on Congress to regulate the elections only
partially and in cooperation with state law-Congress could either oc-
cupy the field, or else it must abstain altogether. 16 The Siebold Court
rejected this contention, mostly by reference to the plain meaning of
Article I, Section 4: "It may either make the regulations, or it may alter
them. If it only alters, leaving, as manifest convenience requires, the
general organization of the polls to the State, there results a necessary
co-operation of the two governments .... 
17
Ex parte Yarbrough1 8 presented a more direct challenge to Con-
gress's authority under the Elections Clause. Yarbrough considered
criminal charges of conspiracy to intimidate and assault, resulting
from the brutal beating of an African-American citizen while he at-
tempted to exercise his right to vote for Congress.19 Counsel for the
alleged assailants and conspirators argued that such criminal charges
were beyond Congress's powers due to the absence of direct textual
authorization in the Constitution for Congress to "provide for
preventing violence exercised on the voter as a means of controlling
his vote ... ."0 The Court dismissed this argument, holding that the
criminal prohibitions in question were "necessary and proper" to Con-
gress's power to regulate the "times, places and manner" of holding
elections for Congress. 21 It focused on Congress's need to ensure its
own survival against "enemies of all republics":22
12. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
13. See id. at 378-79.
14. Id. at 379.
15. Id. at 382.
16. See id. at 382-83.
17. Id. at 383.
18. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
19. Id. at 656-57.
20. Id. at 658.
21. See id. at 657-60.
22. Id. at 658.
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That a government whose essential character is republican,
whose executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose
most numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected
by the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure
this election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of
fraud, is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and de-
mand the gravest consideration.
If it has not this power it is left helpless before the two great
natural and historical enemies of all republics, open violence and
insidious corruption. 23
The Court elaborated on this rationale in In re Coy,2 4 which con-
sidered an indictment for conspiracy to interfere with election officers
and willful neglect by election officers of their duty "in regard to the
custody and safekeeping of the election returns" and persuading
others to do the same. 25 In essence, the defendants were charged with
persuading elections inspectors, "unlawfully and by false and deceitful
speeches, statements, assertions, and promises" to fail in the officials'
duty to deliver certified voting lists and "tally-papers" to the appropri-
ate authorities in connection with a congressional election. 26 Uphold-
ing the statutes, which "made for the security and protection of the
elections held for Representatives and Delegates to Congress" and
"confer[red] authority to punish a conspiracy to prevent or interfere
with that security, by proceedings in the federal courts," the Court
concluded that the law was "necessary to secure the . . . preservation,
proper return, and counting of the votes cast ... "27 Furthermore,
Congress would have the authority to enact any law "necessary to an
honest and fair certification of [congressional elections] ... 28
Smiley v. Holm29 represents the high-water mark in the Court's ex-
pansive rhetoric concerning the scope of government activity em-
braced by the Elections Clause. The Clause once again became the
central focus when a Minnesota citizen challenged that state's 1931
reapportionment plan, which was passed by the state legislature, but
not signed into law by the Governor. 30 Despite the Governor's veto,
23. Id. at 657-58.
24. 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
25. Id. at 750.
26. See id. at 745-48.
27. Id. at 751-52.
28. Id. at 752.
29. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
30. Id. at 361. Note, once again, that the powers vested in Congress and with the
States under Article I, Section 4 are nearly coextensive. Arguments limiting the powers of
either level of government should apply with equal force to both of them. See supra note 8.
[Vol. 38
ELECTIONS CLAUSE
the measure was deposited for enactment with the Secretary of State
of Minnesota. 31 The Secretary argued that the Elections Clause con-
ferred power to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner" of congres-
sional election directly on the legislature, and was therefore immune
from gubernatorial veto.3 2 The Court framed the question in the fol-
lowing manner: does the Elections Clause concern the ordinary law-
making function of the states' legislatures or is it a special function
outside of the normal legislative process?3 3 If it is the former, the legis-
lature would be bound to act only within whatever state constitutional
limitations restricted its power to make law.34 The Court concluded
that the Clause did, indeed, address the ordinary, lawmaking function
of state legislatures, and did not supervene otherwise applicable state
constitutional limitations. 35 As to the Elections Clause's subject mat-
ter, the Court asserted that it "embrace[s] authority to provide a com-
plete code for congressional elections . *..."36
At least one Supreme Court decision from the early twentieth
century purported to limit the scope of the Elections Clause. In New-
berry v. United States,37 the Court held that a federal statute limiting the
campaign expenditures of candidates for Congress in primary elec-
tions did not fit within Article I, Section 4's grant of power by law to
regulate the "manner of holding elections. '38 The Court reasoned
that if the Elections Clause were construed to cover every "prerequi-
site" to an election for Congress or all of those matters that might
affect their outcome, then the federal government could reach such
matters as "education, means of transportation, health, public discus-
sion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and figure of the
candidate . .. . ,, This, in the Court's view, would impermissibly inter-
fere with states' exclusively domestic affairs. 40 The Newberry limitation
31. Id.
32. See id. at 362. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof .. ") (emphasis added).
33. See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 365-66.
34. Id. at 366.
35. Id. at 366-68.
36. Id. at 366.
37. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
38. Id. at 258 ("We cannot conclude that authority to control party primaries or con-
ventions for designating candidates was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power to
regulate the manner of holding elections.").
39. Id. at 257.
40. Id. at 258.
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was short-lived, however, as the Court expressly repudiated it twenty
years later in United States v. Classic.41
B. Limiting "Times, Places and Manner"
More recently, the Supreme Court has embraced a narrower con-
struction of the Elections Clause-never approaching a repudiation
of Smiley and the others, but setting other limitations consistent with
the "complete code" view of Article I, Section 4. First, in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc., v. Thornton,42 the Supreme Court struck down an amend-
ment to the Arkansas State Constitution, which imposed a three-term
limit on that state's candidates for the United States House of Repre-
sentatives. 43 The Court considered, inter alia, the argument that this
amendment regulated the "manner" of elections, consistent with state
authority under Article I, Section 4.44
The Court rejected such a broad construction of the Elections
Clause as "fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers' view . . .45
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained that such a grant of
power to the state governments would have necessarily implied a co-
rollary power on the part of Congress to override the state's regula-
tions by federal legislation. The Framers, concerned about grants of
power to the new Congress that would invite institutional self-aggran-
dizement, would have never approved of such a result.46 As the Fram-
ers understood it, the Elections Clause was not "a source of power to
dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or
to evade important constitutional restraints." 47 Rather, the Clause was
intended as a grant of authority to create "procedural regulations." 48
The Court discussed a class of limited needs that can legitimately give
rise to such procedural regulations. In general, such regulation of the
manner of congressional elections is called for to protect the "integ-
rity and reliability" of the electoral process,49 and to ensure that elec-
tions are "orderly, fair, and honest.. . 'rather than chaos." 50
41. See 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (holding primary elections are elections within the
meaning of the Constitution and are subject to congressional regulation).
42. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
43. Id. at 783.
44. Id. at 832.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 833-34.
48. Id. at 833.
49. Id. at 834 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
50. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
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The Court distinguished Storer v. Brown,51 which upheld Califor-
nia's requirements for independent candidates for elective public of-
fice. Among those requirements were one year of non-registration
with any political party and a minimum signature threshold for nomi-
nation papers.52 Writing for the majority in U.S. Term Limits, Justice
Stevens characterized Storer and other cases upholding actions taken
under the Elections Clause as involving procedures that "did not even
arguably impose any substantive qualifications rendering a class of po-
tential candidates ineligible for ballot position." 53
Distinguishing term limits from regulations that simply dictate
"procedure," the Court pointed out that the Arkansas law "unques-
tionably restrict[s] the ability of voters to vote for whom they wish."'54
Furthermore, term limits "would effect a fundamental change in the
constitutional framework" and as such cannot be adopted either by
Congress or any individual state acting alone. 55 Instead, the Court
held that imposing term limits for members of Congress would re-
quire an amendment to the Constitution, via the Article V process. 56
The Court further clarified this narrow reading of Article I, Sec-
tion 4 in Cook v. Gralike.57 Following U.S. Term Limits, Missouri voters
adopted an amendment to their state constitution, "Article VIII,"
which instructed each member of that state's "congressional delega-
tion 'to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass' an amendment
to the United States Constitution limiting members of the House to
three terms and Senators to two terms.58 Article VIII prescribed that
the statement "DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM
LIMITS" be printed on ballots next to the name of any congressional
candidate who failed to support the federal amendment.59 Also, the
statement "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS"
was to label those candidates who refused to make such a pledge. 60 In
another opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court struck down the Mis-
souri amendment. 61
51. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
52. Id. at 726.
53. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 835.
54. Id. at 837.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
58. Id. at 514.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 514-15.
61. See id. at 525-26.
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Again, the Court emphasized the procedural nature of the grant
of authority in the Elections Clause. States may regulate the "inci-
dents" of congressional elections. 62 "Manner" encompasses matters
like "'notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of
inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election re-
turns.'- 63 By contrast, the Court observed that Article VIII was "plainly
designed to favor candidates who are willing to support the particular
form of a term limits amendment set forth in its text and to disfavor
those who either oppose term limits entirely or would prefer a differ-
ent proposal."64 The Court also assigned great importance to the
probability that Article VIII would "handicap" certain candidates at
"the most crucial stage in the election process-the instant before the
vote is cast."'65 It held that because Article VIII sought to "dictate elec-
toral outcomes," rather than to simply enact procedures for con-
ducting the elections, it was not within the scope of regulation
authorized by the Elections Clause.66
II. Substance Versus Procedure?
As with other areas of law struggling to distinguish between mat-
ters that are "procedural" and those that are "substantive," a bright-
line test would be difficult or impossible to establish. But we may still
ask: is the decision to establish single-member districts more like the
adoption of term limits or more like prescribing the duties of inspec-
tors or the method of publishing returns? The law of Cook and U.S.
Term Limits can be summarized as follows: a regulation concerning
elections to Congress is not procedural, and is therefore outside the
scope of the Elections Clause, where it intentionally dictates or handi-
caps electoral outcomes by exerting pressure at a "crucial stage" of the
election process or "restrict[s] the ability of voters to vote for whom
they wish." 67 Further, a law is not procedural, and therefore outside
the scope of Article I, Section 4, if it "would effect a fundamental
change in the constitutional framework."68 These limitations should
62. See id. at 523.
63. Id. at 523-24 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
64. Id. at 524.
65. Id. at 525 (internal quotation omitted).
66. Id. at 526 (citation omitted).
67. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995).
68. Id.
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apply with equal force to laws enacted either by the states or by
Congress.
The drawing of district lines, or the decision to draw them at all is
every bit as "crucial" a stage in the election process as the moment the
vote is cast, precisely because of the obvious impact it has on out-
comes. From the very first Congress, states have recognized the cru-
cial, outcome-determinative nature of this decision and have behaved
in an accordingly pragmatic manner.69 Furthermore, the decision to
elect members from geographic districts plainly restricts the ability of
citizens to vote for whom they wish. 70 Under some variant of an at-
large election system, a given voter would have the ability to vote for
any statewide congressional candidate of the voter's choosing, regard-
less of where that citizen lived in the state. By contrast, a voter's choice
of congressional candidates in a single-member district is limited to
individuals running for that specific congressional seat. Therefore,
under the U.S. Term Limits and Cook formulation of "manner" regula-
tion, 71 Congress's mandate of single-member district elections would
be outside the scope of Article I, Section 4.
There is, however, another reason why it does not make sense to
treat this decision as merely procedural. Congress, by its periodic ac-
tions to require single-member districts nationwide, has locked in a
single philosophy of representation. We are so accustomed to electing
members of Congress and members of other legislative bodies from
single-member, geographic districts that we may easily overlook the
fact that other sensible and practical notions of representation might
shape our institutions, including Congress. The present system favors
geographic commonality over issue commonality, independent delib-
eration over mandatory instruction, and the representation of specific
individuals over the representation of issues or interests.72 All of these
69. See infra notes 92-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of early state
gamesmanship regarding the choice between district and at-large elections.
70. The idea is simply that, for example, in a state with two candidates apiece for ten
districted seats, any given voter can, at most, cast a ballot for one of them, and would have
to make that choice from between two candidates. If the ten seats were open statewide, the
voter would likely-except perhaps under a very restrictive version of limited-voting-have
the ability to vote for more, and would be choosing from among twenty candidates.
71. Justice Stevens quotes Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) for the "most
crucial stage" language to describe the instant before the vote is cast. Cook v. Gralike, 531
U.S. 510, 525 (2001). Without devoting an unwarranted amount of space to semantics, this
Article takes the position that criticality is not a matter of degree. Components of a system
are either critical, like links in a chain, or not critical, like any given "E" tile in Scrabble-
unless you're trying to spell "election."
72. For a more detailed analysis of these divides, see infra, notes 114-83 and accompa-
nying text.
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choices are plausibly sensible, but none is a necessary condition of
representative democracy. To call them "procedural" reflects an im-
poverished view of representation, and grossly underestimates their
significance.
A. Outcome Determination
The decision to elect members of the House from single-member
districts is outcome determinative in two constitutionally significant
ways. First, the decision to employ district elections necessarily re-
quires the drawing of district lines, which arguably cannot be done
without some impact on the outcome of an election. Second, since a
majority voting block will predictably win all of the congressional seats
in an at-large election state, but substantially fewer seats in any other
system of election, the aggregate impact of a national decision to use
single-member districts has the potential to sway the balance of power
among the states in the House. In fact, as explained infra, that was
probably the intended result.
1. Individual Outcome Determination
It has been argued that drawing district lines necessarily involves
gerrymandering. 73 Professor Dixon points out that a computer can
churn out literally hundreds of equal-population districting plans and
"each plan, because of its somewhat different grouping of partisans
and interests, will have a different-and of course non-neutral-im-
pact on the electoral outcomes."7 4 justice White pointed out as much
in Gaffney v. Cummings:75
[A] politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended
or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results; and, in any event, it
is most unlikely that the political impact of such a plan would re-
main undiscovered by the time it was proposed or adopted, in
which event the results would be both known and, if not changed,
intended.7 6
"Gerrymandering . . ." writes Professor Zagarri, "is as old as the
district system and a direct consequence of its use. '' 77 She recounts
what may be the earliest example of gerrymandering in the new Amer-
73. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Dis-
tricts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICrING IssuEs 7, 8 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds.,
1982).
74. Id. at 8.
75. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
76. Dixon, supra note 73, at 16 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753).
77. ZAGARRI, supra note 5, at 122-23.
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ican republic-Virginian Antifederalists' efforts to block James
Madison's election to the House of Representatives in 1788.78 At the
time, Antifederalists controlled Virginia's legislature and tried to use
that position to maximize the influence of Antifederalists in congres-
sional elections. Most importantly, they sought to ensure that James
Monroe would prevail over "arch-Federalist" James Madison in their
congressional race. 79 Predictably, they created a congressional district
described as "'distorted'. . . into 'a thousand excentrick [sic] angles'
in order to ensure his defeat."80 The ploy was immediately recognized,
and Madison's supporters entertained serious doubts that their candi-
date could ever prevail in such a gerrymandered district. In the end,
however, Madison squeaked by Monroe with a 336-vote margin of vic-
tory.8 ' Gerrymandering was, however, a young art form. Its practition-
ers would improve over time.
The principle mentioned by Professor Dixon-that drawing dis-
trict lines necessarily involves choices-has been pushed to the limits
of its considerable utility by those with the power to draw lines. We
need look no further than the long line of Supreme Court decisions
concerning the art of gerrymandering to understand the outcome-de-
terminative effect of drawing district lines. The results of these consti-
tutional challenges are not important for the purposes of this
discussion-the focus is on the practical result of a line-drawing pro-
cess in the zero-sum game of districting, where every choice of district
boundaries carries non-neutral implications. By this process, individ-
ual races can be decided ex ante.
Gaffney reversed a lower court's decision invalidating, on Equal
Protection grounds, a Connecticut redistricting plan-a gerrymander-
ing scheme designed to effect "political fairness" between the par-
ties.82 The process in question involved a three-member panel,
appointed by the state's House Speaker and Minority Leader, review-
ing the voting results of three previous elections and creating "what
was thought to be a proportionate number of Republican and Demo-
cratic legislative seats."'83 Later, in Davis v. Bandemer,84 the Court sus-
tained an Indiana redistricting plan which, by "familiar techniques"
78. See id. at 122.
79. See id.
80. Id. (quoting Virginia Independent Chronicle (Richmond), Mar. 11, 1789, in First
Federal Elections, II: 393 n.i).
81. See id.
82. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973).
83. Id. at 738.
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such as "stack[ing]" and "wast[ing]" of votes,85 prearranged the reten-
tion of a fifty-seven to forty-three majority in the state's House of Rep-
resentatives by the Republican Party, despite the fact that Democratic
candidates received 53.1% of the vote.8 6
Race has been the most controversial factor in gerrymandering. 87
In Shaw v. Reno,8 8 the Court examined North Carolina's attempts to
create "majority-minority" districts.89 Two minority-controlled legisla-
tive seats were prearranged by creating a district shaped like a "Ror-
schach ink-blot test" or a "bug splattered on a windshield" and
another that stretched for 160 miles, but was often no wider than a
highway corridor, and "[wound] in snakelike fashion through tobacco
country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobble [d]
in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods." 90 The court held that
the plaintiffs had stated a claim that the redistricting plan lacked "suf-
ficient justification" under the Equal Protection Clause. 91
Thus, it is evident that governing bodies can influence, ex ante, or
even conclusively predetermine the outcome of a given legislative
election in a geographically-defined district, by gerrymandering to in-
clude and exclude voters necessary to effect the desired outcome. The
important thing to recognize, for the purpose of this analysis, is that
because any district is on some level "gerrymandered" because of the
zero-sum nature of geographic districting, the decision to require dis-
tricts carries with it a similar outcome-determinative quality at a cru-
cial stage in the democratic process in individual races just as term
limits or unflattering labels affixed to the ballot. Although the precise
84. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). As of this writing, the Supreme Court is revisiting Bandemerin
Vieth v. Jubelirer. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478 (M.D. Pa. 2003), prob. juris.
noted, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 156 L. Ed. 2d 654 (2003).
85. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 117 n.6. "Stacking" and "wasting" in this context involved
the creation of districts where Democrats carried the seat with far greater than the re-
quired 50% majority, while Republican seats were distributed to ensure safe, but relatively
small, majorities. Id.
86. See id. at 115.
87. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First
Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1216-28 (2003) (explaining premises
underlying judicial intervention in race-based districting); Richard H. Pildes, Principled
Limitations on Racial and Partisan Districting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2514-18 (1997) (describing
"highly bizarre" districts resulting from race-based gerrymandering); Theane Evangelis,
Note: The Constitutionality of Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in Districting, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 808-14 (2002) (explaining constitutional limitations on race-based
districting).
88. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
89. See id. at 633-34.
90. Id. at 635-36 (internal quotations omitted).
91. See id. at 649.
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results will sometimes be impossible to predict at the point of decid-
ing on single-member districts as opposed to some other system of
representation, it is certain to impact the outcome of individual races.
2. Aggregate Outcome Determination
The outcome-determinative nature of this decision is even more
striking when viewing the aggregate impact of district-based elections
on a legislature as a whole. Contrary to the general inability to effect
specific political results in individual contests by the simple act of
choosing district elections, but prior to drawing the lines, the decision
to adopt districting was made with an eye toward decisively influenc-
ing a specific political rivalry-that between large states and small
states in Congress. A brief retelling of the history of single-member
districts in the United States House of Representatives will shed some
light on the significance of single-member House districts in deter-
mining aggregate electoral outcomes. In order to give that history
proper context, however, this section will first consider the earliest
American apportionment controversy-the 1787 debate that led to
the "Great Compromise."
Nationalist delegates to the Philadelphia Convention from large
and small states arrived with very different visions of the structure of a
new, American republic. The large-state, or "Virginia Plan," usually
associated with Edmund Randolph, included the blueprints for a "Na-
tional Executive," a "National Judiciary," and a bicameral "National
Legislature," apportioned in both houses by population.92 A highly-
centralized proposal, with strong emphasis on population in its distri-
bution of power, depending ultimately, on the national government's
ability to enforce its mandates by the coercive pressure of military
force, the Virginia Plan was cause for concern among delegates from
small states who feared their representatives would be consistently out-
voted on issues of national importance.93 The main counter-proposal,
the "New Jersey Plan," called for a looser association, with individual
states the most important actors, maintaining the small states' pri-
macy. The New Jersey Plan was criticized as not improving the "weak-
ness and uncertainty" inherent in the Articles of Confederation. 94
The large states were able to use the strength of their numbers at
the Convention to vote down the New Jersey Plan, but the small states
92. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 115
(1977) (internal quotations omitted).
93. See id. at 115-16.
94. Id.
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were numerous enough to prevent any workable consensus behind
the Virginia Plan.95 Despite the flaring tempers of that hot July, the
well-known Great Compromise gathered enough support from each
camp. It provided for an equal vote afforded to each state in the Sen-
ate, and a House of Representatives apportioned according to a "'fed-
eral ratio' "-the sum of the state's free population and three-fifths of
the slave population. 96
The Great Compromise was extremely conciliatory to the small
states-they enjoy power in the Senate disproportionate to their pop-
ulation.97 Quite plausibly the federal Constitution could not have
been enacted without this concession to the small states. The delicate
balance of power in the two houses of Congress, between small and
large states, is a defining feature of the original Constitution. Could it
possibly be altered by simple legislation?
As Congress began to function, the full implications of the Great
Compromise gradually came into focus. Early on, states experimented
and alternated systems of selecting congressmen. The Constitution
does not require any particular method of selection, and Congress did
not act to institute the requirement until 1842.98 Prior to that time,
states broke down into two main categories-those with some form of
district election, and those with at-large elections.99
States quickly realized the outcome-determinative significance of
the choice between at-large and districted elections-the only two
choices in the days before theoretical alternative voting structures.
Following one election in which Pennsylvania elected all eight of its
representatives from the Federalist party and the Eastern part of the
state, one critic declared, "I am sure that Pennsylvania will never again
suffer eight representatives to be elected out of a mere corner of the
state." 100 The state legislature was thereafter pressured to institute a
system of eight single-member districts.101
A pattern became apparent in the early republic: large states pre-
ferred to employ single-member district elections, while smaller states
elected their representatives at large. 10 2 But this was just part of a
larger pattern-gamesmanship had broken out in state legislatures
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. IssAcHARoFF, supra note 1, at 1156.
99. Id. (quoting ZAGARRI, supra note 5, at 105).
100. Id. at 1157 (internal quotation omitted).
101. Id.
102. See id.
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across the young country in an effort to maximize the political power
of each state's delegation. As was the case in the above Pennsylvania
election, which prompted that large state to implement district elec-
tions, small states that elected at large would tend to send a single-
party delegation of representatives to Congress; by contrast, large
states electing from single-member districts would produce more frac-
tured delegations.10 3 This allowed delegations from smaller, at-large
states to become more influential in the House of Representa-
tives' 4-a state selecting all of its representatives from one party, and
of like mind on important issues, may exert more influence than a
state sending a relatively balanced delegation. 10 5 Larger states eventu-
ally became cognizant of this consequence of districting, and some
began to consider a shift back to at-large elections.10 6 Each group of
states was beginning to realize the full well of power allotted by the
Great Compromise of 1787.
Small states then had reason to fear that if large states switched to
at-large elections, small states would lose all influence in the House as
unified, large-state delegations began to vote in concert.1 0 7 At a criti-
cal moment in 1842, where nine of the then twenty-six states were
using at-large elections, Congress stepped in, mandating that all mem-
bers be elected from single-member districts.10 8 The Reapportion-
ment Act was reenacted several times, but lapsed in 1929.109 Once
again, between 1929 and 1967, several states of varying sizes elected
their members at large. In 1967, however, a Congress motivated by a
fear that Southern states had the ability to dilute, or even eliminate,
minority voting power through the use of at-large elections, once
again enacted a requirement of single-member districts. 110
The small states' fears of 1842 seem justifiable when viewed in
isolation, but when seen in the context of the Great Compromise, the
small states' position is not quite faithful to the founder's critical bar-
gain. Is this disadvantage anything other than small states' end of that
bargain? It was a *compromise after all. It must have been understood at
the Philadelphia Convention that smaller states would have less influ-
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. E.g., a state sending four Democrats and four Republicans to the House has no
impact on giving either party a majority.
106. IssACHAROFF, supra note 1, at 1157-58.
107. Id. at 1158.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
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ence in the House and relatively greater influence in the Senate. With-
out designing the House to mirror the Senate, the disparity is the
simple consequence of small states' smallness.
The appropriate balance between large and small states has al-
ways been a matter of constitutional significance-to alter it "would
effect a fundamental change in the constitutional framework." '111 If
the Great Compromise is to be revisited, it should be done by virtue of
the process outlined by Article V. The Elections Clause is not a means
by which Congress may "evade important constitutional restraints."'1 12
B. Defining Consent and Representation: Merely Procedural?
In another important sense, the decision on the part of Congress
to mandate the election of its members through single-member dis-
trict elections cannot be belittled as "procedural." Representation in a
democracy is not a unitary concept, nor has it historically been a sub-
ject of consensus. Professor Lijphart has identified sixteen competing
goals of representation, which cannot be fully reconciled under any
given system of representative government. 11 3 This section describes
three important divides in the philosophical debate on the meaning
of representation: geographic/spatial vs. demographic representa-
tion, mandate-based vs. independent or deliberative representation,
and representation of people vs. representation of interests or is-
sues. 114 The congressional decision to require district-based elections
selects a system of spatial representation with some demographic fea-
tures. This favors a deliberative and independent system, and also gen-
erally favors representation of individuals, grouped by geographic
commonality, but requires some voters to accept representation of
interests.
Any of these choices may be viewed as desirable or undesirable.
Without debating the merits of any of the above approaches to repre-
sentation, this Part argues that it belittles the significance of the act of
choosing when it is labeled "procedural" and grouped with details
such as proper notice format or the duties of canvassers. The question
of how the citizens of a democracy signal their consent, how they ag-
gregate to legitimate a given representation scheme, goes directly to
111. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995).
112. Id. at 833-34.
113. See Arend Lijphart, Comparative Perspectives on Fair Representation: The Plurality-Ma-
jority Rule, Geographical Districting, and Alternative Electoral Arrangements, in REPRESENTATION
AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 145-47 (Bernard Grofman, et al. eds., 1982).
114. See infra notes 116-183 and accompanying text.
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the character of our republic. Questions concerning appropriate rep-
resentation lie "at the heart of power, obligation, and obedience."'115
1. Spatial Versus Demographic Representation
Professor Zagarri defines "spatial representation" as referring to
political communities which view relevant units of represented people
according to preexisting counties, towns, parishes, and other political
subdivisions. 1 6 During the founding era, states embracing this view
typically supported a national legislature giving equal representation
to each state "as [a] territorial unit[ ].1117 Later, viewing the state as
the territorial unit of primary importance, these states, typically
smaller states, tended to elect members of Congress by at-large elec-
tions rather than, for example, equal-population districts.' 18 This sys-
tem was a holdover from the English, "corporate" system, which based
representation in Parliament on "counties, boroughs, and universi-
ties."'1 9 The English system was, in turn, a relic of that country's feu-
dal past-lords were represented in their capacity as landowners,
while servants of the land were deemed to be represented through the
lords.' 20 In England, the legacy of spatial representation was the crea-
tion of so-called "rotten boroughs" which, despite having little or no
population, received representation in Parliament on the same order
of magnitude as highly populated areas.' 21
Many in the revolutionary culture of eighteenth century America
viewed corporate representation as decidedly "unrepublican."122 Indi-
vidual equality, a recurring theme in the developing American repub-
lic, led some revolutionaries to question the basic fairness of a system
that gave certain individuals proportionately more influence over the
election of a representative than others were afforded, based simply
on an ancient-or, in America, new, but relatively arbitrary-munici-
pal delineation.' 23 The wisdom and fairness of English-style, corporate
or spatial representation was most open to question in larger states,
which tended to have larger, more mobile populations than smaller
115. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 31 (1989).
116. See ZAGARRI, supra note 5, at 5.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 37.
120. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 367.
121. See ZACARRI, supra note 5, at 37.
122. See id. at 36.
123. See id. at 33.
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states. 124 State governments in large states began to place more em-
phasis on population equality in representation. For example, they
adopted numerical apportionment in their legislatures, preferred a
national legislature based on proportional representation, and tended
to hold elections for Congress from within districts divided, as nearly
as practicable, by population. 12 5 In contrast to citizens of smaller
states, who thought of the state as a "territorial community," citizens
of larger states "regarded the state as an amalgam of diverse interests
that an accident of history had united into a single unit."1 26
Zagarri argues that "demographic representation [has] acquired
a virtual hegemony throughout the United States." 127 This Article
takes a nearly opposite position, arguing that by requiring elections
based on geographically defined districts, rather than at large or via
some alternative voting structure, our system of congressional election
retains many of the spatial features of the British system of representa-
tion from which the founding was to have been a relatively clean
break. It is true that the equalization of the population of each respec-
tive geographic district represents an advance in the theory that legis-
lators ought to represent people rather than "trees or acres," 128 but it
does not quite break the trees and acres' stranglehold on our repre-
sentative institutions. Zagarri points out that the "corporate method
of representation presumed that physical proximity generated com-
munal sentiment," and that "each community [spoke] with a single
voice .... "129 This Article argues, however, that geographic districts,
despite equal population and a potential to ignore preexisting munic-
ipal boundaries, share this presumption with the English system.
The view that the creation of equally populous legislative districts
provides adequate demographic representation requires the assump-
tion of a homogeneous population-if no other demographic vari-
ables exist or have any relevance besides raw population, then all one
needs to do to ensure a fair and accurately "representative" legislature
124. See id. at 5.
125. See id. at 6. Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina all experimented with proportional representation in the lower houses of
their respective legislatures in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Id. at 33.
126. Id. at 123.
127. Id. at 148.
128. See id. at 149 (quoting STANLEY L. KUTLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION: READINGS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 596 (2d ed. 1977)). The original
quote comes, of course, from Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.").
129. ZAGARRI, supra note 5, at 37-38.
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is to carve the republic into districts of equal population. In a given
election, however, any number of demographic considerations are
likely to be important, but undermined by the existence of geographic
boundaries to stifle potential voting blocs (e.g. race, income, age, gen-
der, religion, ethnicity, and education immediately come to mind).
The American system, which features geographically-circumscribed
districts, but with borders gerrymandered to advantage chosen groups
or individual politicians, is actually somewhat schizophrenic in at-
tempting to produce particular demographic and political results,
while refusing to completely abandon geography as a basis for group-
ing voters.
Other systems may be better able to transmit demographic varia-
tions among the electorate without producing the controversy that in-
evitably seems to result from using otherwise-arbitrary land formations
to serve as the basic representative unit. Pure proportional representa-
tion is the system best able to create a legislature that most closely
mirrors these demographic features in the represented population. 130
In a statewide election for ten congressional seats, for example, any
minor party able to secure a minimal threshold number of votes-say
ten percent-will be guaranteed at least one seat. Thus, any demo-
graphic grouping of sufficient number, but still constituting a minor-
ity-even a small minority-statewide, or within imaginable district
divisions, would be able to secure representation. By contrast, a mi-
nority interest may constitute a popular minority in every district state-
wide and so, in a congressional election based on such districts, be
unable to secure any representation at all. Note that a pure at-large,
majoritarian election scheme also creates strong potential for a major-
ity group to shut all minority groups out of a representative institu-
tion. Proportional representation has, however, never captured the
American imagination.1 31 Variants on a pure at-large system, such as
cumulative 132 or limited voting, 133 would, like proportional represen-
tation, provide the potential for representative bodies to mirror rele-
130. See ISSACStAROFF, supra note 1, at 1160.
131. See id.
132. "Cumulative voting" describes a process by which "each voter is given as many
votes to cast as there are seats to be filled. Voters are free to distribute their votes among
candidates in any way they choose." Id. at 1099. (quoting Richard H. Pildes, Gimme Five:
Non-gerrymandeingRacialJustice, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993). Under this system, "minority
groups with common interests and strong preferences for a particular candidate can en-
sure her election, even in the face of a hostile majority." Id. at 1100.
133. "Limited voting" describes a system in which voters are given "fewer votes to cast
than the total number of seats at issue." IsSAcHARoFF, supra note 1, at 1141. The effect is "to
prevent the same majority from dominating each and every seat." Id.
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vant demographic features. Under such a system, "each voter would
create her own election district by the way she distributed her
votes." 1 3
4
Often, it has been possible to shape districts based on some of
these other considerations.1 3 5 Some of the most contentious issues in
the law of American democracy have involved creative attempts on the
part of those tasked with drawing congressional and other legislative
districts so as to better reflect the existence of minority interests.136
Clearly when many Americans think of the concept of "representa-
tion," it implies more than one-person, one-vote-it implies actual
representation of racial, political, and other demographic minorities.
Our struggles with stretching the single-member district into shapes
that better serve our demographic and political ideals in representa-
tion indicate that there is strong tension between these demographic
goals and the conviction expressed by Professor Zagarri that,
"[r] epresentation systems ... inherently possess a spatial component.
Some geographic unit is always going to be considered in establishing
the basis of representation."137 James Thomas Tucker disagrees, argu-
ing that our districting practices unnecessarily privilege geographic
factors over demographic and "relational" factors, thus undercutting
the Reynolds court's "admonition that representation must be based
upon the choices of individual voters"' 38 and not "trees or acres."'139
Given the current intellectual curiosity surrounding alternative
voting structures 140 that might do a better job of transmitting relevant
demographic features into legislatures, it seems reasonable to specu-
late that more experimentation might take place if Congress had not
made the decision to lock the republic into this form of spatial system.
Whether, however, one finds this Article's take on American district-
based elections and spatial representation to be persuasive, or prefers
Professor Zagarri's numbers-based view of demographic representa-
tion, it must be acknowledged that the district-based system represents
a choice to place Congress somewhere along the spectrum of possible
134. Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member
Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1135, 1136 (1993).
135. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases of gerry-
mandering to accommodate political and racial groups.
136. Recall the "Rorschach"-shaped district at issue in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635
(1993).
137. ZAGARRI, supra note 5, at 147.
138. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 385.
139. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
140. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the
United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241 (1995); see also Guinier, supra note 134.
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notions of spatial and demographic representation. Given the age and
fundamental nature of this question, to affix the "procedural" label to
the decision to select this system nationally, is a terrific
oversimplification.
2. "The Mandate-Independence Controversy"141
Another important question concerning the nature of represen-
tation is: what is the responsibility of a chosen representative whose
good-faith personal views about the welfare of his constituents are at
odds with the known wishes of the constituents themselves? Two ex-
treme views can be identified. On one extreme are the "mandate the-
orists" who maintain that where the chosen representative deviates
from the known wishes of the represented people, his or her actions
do not constitute "representation" at all. 142 The opposite end of the
spectrum theorizes that not only must the representative be endowed
with complete discretion to exercise personal judgment, but he must
be so completely independent that "constituents have no right even to
exact campaign promises .... ,,143
In between these extremes, Professor Pitkin identifies three,
more moderate, views of representation. One moderate position
would suggest that a representative has some freedom to act on his
best judgment, but has a responsibility to seek instructions from the
represented before entering into any controversial decision.1 44 A sec-
ond moderate position would allow the representative to act indepen-
dently, but only in the absence of explicit instructions from his
constituents. 145 Finally, and closest to the strict independence model,
the third moderate position permits independence of action, but only
to the extent that independent action will not contravene an explicit
campaign promise. 146
The mandate/independence debate played out between the Fed-
eralists and Antifederalists during the formative years of American de-
mocracy. At the risk of severe oversimplification, the Antifederalists
supported the most intimate relationship between a republican repre-
sentative and his constituents. 147 This required that the representative
have close, personal knowledge of the issues affecting the repre-
141. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144 (1967).
142. See id. at 146.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See ZAGARRI, supra note 5, at 90.
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sented, that the electorate be able to closely monitor the actions of
the representative, and even, perhaps, a requirement that a represen-
tative be subject to a right of instruction on the part of his constitu-
ents-an extreme version of the mandate theorists' view of the nature
of representation. Federalists, by contrast, preferred a deliberative re-
public, with representatives who are "superior, dispassionate men,
calmly debating in the light of reason, and so will refuse to give way to
the factious desires of their constituents."1 48
Setting aside, for the moment, the set of plausible intermediate
positions, it is also recognized that mandate theorists and indepen-
dence theorists have different notions concerning the representative's
responsibility for the national interest. Independence theorists, on the
one hand, would urge that a national legislator has an important re-
sponsibility to pursue nationally desirable goals, even in the likely
event that the national interest conflicts with the interests of those he
represents.1 49 Mandate theorists, by contrast, argue that the represen-
tative must act in the interests of his local constituency because the
national interest amounts to little more than the sum of the various
local interests. 150
This leads to another question, related closely to the mandate/
independence debate-to whom does the representative owe his pri-
mary loyalty, his constituents, or to the legislative institution of which
he is a member?1 51 Professor Reid points out that Colonial and early
American citizens expected the loyalty of their representatives to run
directly to the people who elected them.15 2 British subjects of the
same era-roughly the period of the American Revolution-would
have the more mixed expectation that while a member of the House
of Commons owed his primary responsibility to his constituents, this
was not taken to imply service to their material needs. Rather, the
representative was expected to maintain their liberty, but by uphold-
ing the independence of the House of Commons, which meant inde-
pendence vis A vis the crown. 1 53
Where does our representative democracy, and specifically the
House of Representatives, lie along this spectrum of mandate/inde-
pendence models? One of the most striking features of the develop-
148. PITKIN, supra note 141, at 193.
149. See id. at 147.
150. See id.
151. See REID, supra note 115, at 64-65.
152. Id. at 64.
153. Id.
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ment of representation at the national level in America is the degree
of insularity achieved by members of the House from the adverse po-
litical consequences of their actions. During the forty-year period be-
tween 1960 and 2000, fewer than 20 percent of elections for House
representatives were decided by margins of less than 10 percent. 15 4 In
2002, 64 percent of Democrats who were reelected to their House
seats captured at least two-thirds of the vote or ran unopposed.1 55 91
percent scooped up at least 55 percent at the polls. 156 Unless this re-
flects extreme satisfaction on the part of voters with their representa-
tives, it reveals a defect in the system, the blame for which lies squarely
on the shoulders of mandated single-member districts, and the inevi-
table gerrymandering that results from that system of representation.
Each state's majority party has the ability to "carve out safe seats," 157
which it may use as a tool to protect incumbents or to install a mem-
ber of a particular party by analyzing past voting behavior, and run-
ning the data through specialized software designed to construct ideal
district configurations, yielding highly predictable election results.' 58
The consequence is that incumbent representatives are virtually invul-
nerable to defeat, provided they maintain the requisite level of sup-
port at the state capital. As one Republican official described it, "' [i] n
the politics of redistricting, politicians get to choose the voters.' "159
Disturbing as this trend may be, the Supreme Court has held that pro-
tection of incumbency is a valid criterion in creating legislative
districts. 160
Such a system is utterly incompatible with a mandate-driven
model of representation. Not only can voters exercise no right of in-
struction, as the most extreme mandate theorists would prefer, the
voter has virtually no recourse against a representative who is sent to
Congress and behaves contrarily to the wishes of even significant ag-
gregations of the electorate. The citizen may vote, but it is a mere
formality if either that voter is lumped together with like-minded indi-
viduals in a safe district for another incumbent, or used as filler in a
154. Joann Dann, Safe but Sony: The Way We Redistrict Destroys the Middle Ground, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, 2001, at BI.
155. Dick Morris, The House of Extremes, JEWISH WORLD REVIEW, INSIGHT, Nov. 12, 2002,
available at http://newsandopinion.com/1102/morris11302.asp (last accessed April 18,
2004).
156. Id.
157. Dann, supra note 154, at B3.
158. See How to Rig an Election, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27-May 3, 2002, at 29, 30.
159. Dann, supra note 154, at B3.
160. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966).
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district served by a representative with whom he disagrees. The result
must be a Congress that is utterly non-responsive to the wishes of the
voters. It also seems likely to produce a body whose membership feels
more loyalty to the institution of Congress, or at least to his party lead-
ership within Congress, than they would to any particular constituency
with virtually no recourse against the representative.
Is this an acceptable price to pay for the nurturing of exper-
ienced legislators who might be capable of the type of dispassionate
deliberation that Madison and the Federalists had hoped for? Setting
aside the fairly obvious conclusion that Madison would have preferred
shorter tenures and greater accountability in the House of Represent-
atives, the problem is that there is no guarantee of that type of deliber-
ation. No empirical data presents itself, but citizens have reason for
skepticism. The present system may offer the worst of both worlds-
independence with no guarantee of enlightened deliberation.
Some hope may come from the existence of party primaries. A
given candidate for the House may be relatively invulnerable to a chal-
lenge from a member of the opposing party, but perhaps vulnerable
to a primary challenge from a member of his own party. This opportu-
nity for a voice in the selection of representatives does more, however,
to facilitate the selection of capable deliberators than it does to give
voters an opportunity to aggregate so as to provide a candidate with a
mandate on specific issues. In a district carved out by Party A for the
purpose of predetermining that a member of Party A be elected to
Congress, it is unlikely that a candidate in the primary election held
by Party A would be nominated while vocally espousing views on issues
that deviated very far from those of Party A's usual platform. Voters
may be able to aggregate and nominate a slightly more moderate can-
didate than would otherwise be available, but no unusual departure
from that Party's positions is likely. Indeed, it has been observed that
the existence of "safe seats" in Congress has encouraged the emer-
gence of more extreme views from those politicians who are shielded
from the electoral pressures of those who might be sympathetic to
many of the opposing party's positions. 161 Instead, the best a voter
may be able to hope for is to select the most intelligent, articulate, or
otherwise capable primary candidate from among a slate of candi-
dates with similar views.
Even if we disregard the issue of gerrymandering, the existence of
geographically defined congressional districts may thwart voters from
161. See Dann, supra note 154, at B3.
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aggregating with others to provide a mandate to a candidate on a
given issue or set of issues. Assume the following hypothetical. Citizen
X of District Y is passionate about protecting endangered species, and
has no other interests in government of any kind. Candidate Z agrees
with Citizen X on all such issues, and is similarly one-dimensional. Un-
less Candidate Z is running in District Y, Citizen X obviously cannot
vote for him. At-large elections, or one of the alternative voting struc-
tures, would permit Citizen X to vote for Candidate Z as long as they
were operating in the same state. The best Citizen X may be able to
do, when he casts his ballot in a district-based election, is to vote for a
candidate, in whose politics X has no interest, but who X believes is
the brightest, most articulate, or has the potential to be the most tal-
ented legislator. Interposing geographic constraints between voters
and candidates for Congress, at least in states allotted numerous rep-
resentatives in the House, cuts down on the voter's ability to prospec-
tively instruct a candidate whose positions he supports and to
remonstrate those candidates whose actions in Congress meet with his
disapproval.
3. Representing Issues and Interests Versus Representing
Individuals
"I represent working families . ."162
"I represent... family values . ."163
162. Sara Kugler, Colorado Lawmakers Declared 'Conservative' by Magazine New American,
DENVER POST, Aug. 6, 1999, at A-20 (quoting Congressman James McGovern of Massachu-
setts ("Fortunately, I represent working families in Massachusetts, not rabidly partisan mag-
azine editors.")); see alsoJonathan Riskind, NRA Runs Radio Ads Supporting Tiberi, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2000, at 2C (quoting Ohio congressional candidate Marc Guthrie
spokesperson Randy Borntrager ('Jerry [Springer] knows Marc will represent the working
families in Congress and Bob Ney will continue to represent the special interests.")); Speak-
ing of.... DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 12, 2000, Opinion, at 7A (quoting Texas Demo-
cratic Party Chair Molly Beth Malcolm ("They are going to see that the Democratic
candidates we have running are the people that represent working families and Texas val-
ues.")); David Kocieniewski, In TVDebate, Republicans Turn Their Fire on Corzine, N. Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2000, at B2 (quoting U.S. Senate candidate James W. Treffinger ("We Republicans
represent the working families ....")); Bob McCarthy, Never a Dull Moment in this Town,
BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 19, 1997, at 3H (quoting New York Congressman Jack Quinn ("I still
think I'm the one who represents working families . ")).
163. Jerry Fallstrom, Bronson's Character Under Fire; Pam Bronson's "Family-Values" Cam-
paign Has Come Under Attack By Her Political Opponent - And Her Estranged Husband, ORLANDO
SENTINEL TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 1994, at 1 (quoting Florida House of Representatives candi-
date David Knolwes ("I've been married for 15 years to the same woman. I think I re-
present the family values that most people want in this community.")); see also BALT. SUN,
Sept. 6, 1995, at 14A (Kathie Krieger, Letter to the Editor ("Cal Ripken . . .represents
family values ... .
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We hear statements like these from our representatives and those
who aspire to representative capacity all the time without stopping to
think about what they mean in the context of our democracy. Pitkin
devotes a great deal of space to contrasting the difference between the
representation of "unattached abstractions"1 64 and the representation
of people who have interests.1 65 This section will summarize the dis-
tinction and attempt to apply it to the decision to elect members of
Congress from single-member districts rather than some other, less-
restrictive system.
Edmund Burke is credited with developing the concept that rep-
resentatives may not be the direct representatives of those who elect
them, but rather the representative of the nation as a whole 166 and
"unattached abstractions. 1 67 Burke's philosophy assumes that "gov-
ernment should rest on wisdom and not on will . "... 168 Indeed, he
may have preferred methods other than elections as a means to select
society's elite for the task of wise representation. 169 Because the con-
sent of any individual or group of voters was unimportant to his model
of representation, Burke was comfortable with "virtual" rather than
"actual" representation:
What Burke, in fact, says is that some parts of the nation are repre-
sented "actually" or "literally," that is, they elect one or more mem-
bers to Parliament; but a town or region that is not actually
represented may nevertheless be represented "virtually"-virtual
representation being a relationship in which "there is a commu-
nion of interest and sympathy in feelings and desires between
those who act in the name of any description of people and the
people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually
chosen by them."170
This was the political theory that permitted the British "eight-
eenth-century legal mind" to make constitutional sense of what the
modern legal mind would view as the obviously subservient position of
the American Colonies to those geographic regions in Britain that ac-
tually sent representatives to Parliament-i.e., taxation without repre-
sentation. 171 Americans were said to have a "'community of interests"'
164. PITKIN, supra note 141, at 168.
165. See id. at 190-93.
166. See id. at 168-69.
167. Id. at 168.
168. Id. at 169.
169. See id. at 171. "Burke actually says that decreasing the number of voters would
increase representation because it would add to the voter's 'weight and independency.'"
Id.
170. Id. at 173.
171. See REID, supra note 115, at 57-58.
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with members of Parliament "'arising from their trade, by which a
great number of people in Britain, both electors of members of parlia-
ment and others, are deeply interested in preventing them from being
oppressed."'1 72 Particularly landowners in America would be "virtu-
ally" and effectively represented in Parliament because Parliament
had "'shewn [sic] them always Attention .. '. ,"173 The American
Revolution was the public and spectacular failure of this, most ex-
treme, view of representation of interests.
The Federalists and, indeed, all American Revolutionaries, vehe-
mently rejected the Burke model of representation. "'Taxation with-
out representation is tyranny . .. ' "174 But the rejection of virtual
representation does not necessarily lead to the complete substitution
of persons for interests in representation philosophy. Madison, after
all, conceived of important interest groups-"factions"-battling one
another into a stalemate and stable republic. 175 The main difference
between interests as Burke saw them and as Madison saw them was
that Burke's "interests" were "clearly defined, broad, objective group-
ings. . ."176 while Madison saw "multiple, shifting alignments, largely
subjective ... .-177 Burke perceived that "Birmingham is virtually rep-
resented in the English Parliament because both it and Bristol are of
the trading interest. Bristol sees to it that a representative of the trad-
ing interest is sent to Parliament, and Birmingham thus has its spokes-
man."17 8 Madison would regard that view as overly simplistic:
While there is still a "landed interest" and a "manufacturing inter-
est," "These classes may again be subdivided according to the dif-
ferent production of different situations and soils, and according
to different branches of commerce and manufactures." These eco-
nomic groupings are supplemented and crosscut by others
"founded on accidental differences in political, religious, or other
opinions, or an attachment to the persons of leading
individuals."1 79
Madison's stable republic would, however, contain the tendencies
of such "irregular passion" from subverting the long-term good by
utilizing representation as a means of "stalemating" action based on
172. Id. at 59.
173. Id.
174. PITKIN, supra note 141, at 191.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 192.
178. Id. at 178.
179. Id. at 192 (internal citations omitted).
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interested passion.1 80 "Only if each representative pursues the factious
interests of his constituency can the various factious interests in the
nation balance each other off in the government ... s"181 Direct con-
sent of the individual in pursuit of his factious interests is crucial,
under this model, because an unrepresented individual, or'group of
individuals, with no direct outlet in the representative body would nat-
urally tend to pursue his temporary, factious goals outside of the des-
ignated forum. This would unleash the potential for subversion of the
common good through anti-social, or at least un-republican, means.
The violence of the American Revolution Madison had just witnessed
was a vivid demonstration of this weakness of Burke's model.
In most important respects, Madison's view of representation pre-
vailed over Burke's. At least as a matter of abstract philosophical un-
derpinning, Americans generally would not accept the complete
disenfranchisement of any significant group simply on the basis of
shared interests with represented persons.
We do not, however, currently utilize the most efficient republi-
can instruments for achieving direct consent by interested individuals
to representation in the national legislature. By interposing geo-
graphic constraints, which are at best arbitrary, and at worst calculated
to negate consent between the voter and the representative of his
choice, Congress has dealt a blow to the concept that individuals in
pursuit of interests must be represented directly, and have some
means to consent or refuse consent to representation, in order to give
rise to the legitimate form of republican government envisioned by
Madison. It is true that, within a given congressional district, absent
the sort of gerrymandered subversion of consent discussed infra, fac-
tional interest groups have some ability to align and choose a repre-
sentative to their liking.
At least in large states with many representatives in Congress,
however, the mechanism would be much more efficient if those indi-
viduals sharing common interests could aggregate on a statewide basis
to choose the congressman best able and most willing to pursue their
common goals. Under an at-large system of cumulative voting, for ex-
ample, "the relevant unit of participation is the 'interest group' or the
interest constituency. Interests are those self-identified voluntary con-
stituencies who choose to combine because of like minds .... "182
Tucker argues that under such alternative schemes, "each voter is able
180. See id. at 196.
181. Id.
182. See Guinier, supra note 134, at 1140.
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to define the nature of the representative/constituent relationship
. .. ."183 Superior methods of obtaining the consent of the governed
are foreclosed by Congress's choice of geographically defined
districts.
Single-member districts make it far more likely that sizeable mi-
norities in. any given congressional district will be unable to select a
member to their liking. Deprived of this ability, the voter may be re-
signed to accepting the virtual representation of a member of Con-
gress who claims to represent them, their interests, or their abstract
values. As noted above, candidates for office often signal to the voters
that they "represent" some broader or narrower alignment of inter-
ests, and they often claim representation of that group, or even an
abstract concept, on a statewide basis. 184 "Working families" may be a
poor example, mostly because nobody really knows who it is that falls
outside of that group. If it is taken to mean labor, the middle class,
"soccer moms," Democrats, or some similar swath of the state's popu-
lation, and "family values" is read as a code word for "conservative,"
probably white, and affluent two-parent households with 2.3 children,
the situation begins to resemble that which Burke describes as the
"virtual" representation of Birmingham by the members of Parliament
elected from Bristol. These "working families" or "family values" voters
may have no real opportunity to vote for a candidate in their district
who claims to represent them. More likely, they have an opportunity
to cast a formal vote in an election whose outcome has been predeter-
mined by gerrymandered district lines. The best that these subgroups
may be able to hope for is that a candidate from some other district
claiming to "represent" them will be elected and will pursue an
agenda consistent with their interests. They will have had no opportu-
nity to affirmatively signal their consent to his election.
We are comfortable with the result, however, because the district
system is usually able to achieve a rough balance between at least the
broadest interest groups-Democrats and Republicans. Despite this
comfort, which prevailed for hundreds of years in Imperial England,
but became unacceptable in Colonial America-largely because it was
harming the material needs of the virtually represented colonists-we
should recognize that it is not the pure system of actual representa-
tion envisioned by Madison. To be sure, the single-member district
system does not approach the egregious tyranny that characterized
Parliament's domination of the Colonies. Gradually shifting political
183. Tucker, supra note 3, at 397.
184. See supra notes 162, 163.
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alignments make it at least theoretically possible that at any given
time, an individual may be able to consent to the representative of his
choosing. It must be pointed out, however, that fictional district
boundaries interfere with the most efficient system of consent, and
their very existence is a key feature of the prevailing model of Ameri-
can republicanism.
Conclusion
The choice between single-member districts and other voting sys-
tems is clearly of a different character from choices related to "no-
tices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of
inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election re-
turns." 185 Single-member districts affect the outcome of our elections,
the composition of our representative institutions, and ultimately the
character of our republican system. Unlike the size and shape of a
ballot, or a prohibition against interfering with election officials, this
is not a question of how we signal our consent, but rather whose con-
sent is relevant and necessary to legitimate representative democracy
in America. This article does not go so far as to suggest that Congress
chose poorly. It may well be that single-member districts are the "least
bad" method of aggregating consent, and they are certainly superior
to other systems that might be imagined. But to characterize it as a
"procedural" choice undermines its significance, and may have a chil-
ling effect on public discourse. The American republican experiment
should be based on perfecting the mechanism by which the govern-
ment seeks the consent of the governed. At the very least, the propri-
ety and legality of the status quo should not be assumed.
185. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
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